Who cares about the survival of the eurozone?

"CEPS Senior Fellow Paul De Grauwe expresses astonishment in this new Commentary at the continued insistence in both Brussels and Frankfurt on budgetary austerity as the necessary and sufficient response to stop the government debt crisis in the eurozone. In his view, the austerity programmes should be softened and spread over a longer period of time, allowing the automatic stabilisers in the national budgets to prevent the economies from spiralling downwards. Furthermore, he reiterates his argument that the ECB should take up its role of lender of last resort in the government bond markets of illiquid but solvent member countries of the eurozone."

Era inevitável e e não havia alternativa ...

"A maioria PSD-CDS vai propor que a taxa de redução progressiva, correspondente a um subsídio, seja aplicada aos subsídios de férias e de Natal entre os 600 e os 1100 euros, em vez de começar nos 485 euros.

... mais 120 mil pensionistas e mais 40 mil funcionários públicos não vão sofrer reduções nos subsídios de Natal e de Férias em 2012.

... Esta medida custa 130 milhões e será compensada com um aumento da taxa liberatória sobre as mais-valias bolsistas e transferências para 25 por cento. A proposta de Orçamento do Estao previa uma taxa de 21,5 por cento."

Um pequeno recuo para que tudo fique na mesma. O Dr. Jorge Coelho sorri...

Nouriel Roubini explica ...

Prepare for riots in euro collapse, Foreign Office warns

Return to sovereign currencies wouldn't be as traumatic as assumed

"The currency team at Bank of America Merrill Lynch have taken a stab at what "fair value" would be for the major legacy currencies in the euro in the event of a breakup. And they've come up with some quite surprising results...

The conclusion is that Spain, Italy, Portugal and France are all overvalued against the US dollar as things stand... That's not so surprising, you might say, and if anything probably understates the true position.

But look at the countries thought to be undervalued. Ireland, on the Merrill Lynch analysis, is the most undervalued even though it is undoubtedly completely bust, while Germany, which conventional wisdom would say was massively undervalued as a result of its membership of the euro, is actually only quite marginally undervalued – by around 5pc. If Germany left, says the team, then the euro fair value would fall only 2pc against the dollar. If Italy left, it would rise only 3pc.

These are not big swings... it's possible that return to sovereign currencies wouldn't be quite as traumatic as everyone assumes."

Death of a currency as Eurogeddon approaches (Telegraph)

"It's time to think what hitherto markets have regarded as unthinkable – that the euro really is on its last legs.

... markets [are] starting to bet on what was previously a minority view - a complete collapse, or break-up, of the euro. Up until the past few days, it has remained just about possible to go along with the idea that ultimately Germany would bow to pressure and do whatever might be required to save the single currency. ... But there comes a point in every crisis where the consensus suddenly shatters. That's what has just occurred, and with good reason. In recent days, it has become plain as a pike staff that the lady's not for turning.

... Suddenly, no-one wants to hold euro denominated assets of any variety, and that includes what had previously been thought the eurozone safe haven of German bunds. Investors have gone on strike. The Americans are getting their money out as fast as they decently can. British banks have stopped lending to all but their safest eurozone counterparts, and even those have been denied access to dollar funding...

... Contingency planning is in progress throughout Europe. From the UK Treasury on Whitehall to the architectural monstrosity of the Bundesbank in Frankfurt, everyone is desperately trying to figure out precisely how bad the consequences might be.

What they are preparing for is the biggest mass default in history. There's no orderly way of doing this. European finance and trade is too far integrated to allow for an easy unwinding of contracts. It's going to be anarchy.

It's worth stressing here that for the moment the contingency planning is confined to officialdom. This week, for instance, we've had the Financial Services Authority's Andrew Bailey admit that he's asked UK banks to plan for a disorderly breakup of the euro. He'd be failing in his duties if he hadn't. Europe's political elite, as ever several steps behind the reality, still regards the prospect as unimaginable.

They need to wake up fast; it's happening before their very eyes."

Eu avisei ...

Anda alguém a pensar em planos de contingência aqui no rectângulo ?

Ao preço a que está a gasolina ...

... os cocktails Molotov são uma arma para meninos ricos.

Os revolucionários proletários ainda vão ser obrigados a empenhar os iPhones.

P.S. Then again, talvez este aumento da procura justifique o aumento de preços em bomba em plena depressão.

Bento XVI sobre a usura

"I then greet the representatives of the Italian National Anti-Usury Council, which is commemorating its 10th anniversary. Dear friends, the presence of so many of you gives me the opportunity to express my deep appreciation for the courageous and generous work you do for families and individuals affected by the deplorable social scourge of usury. I hope that many people will rally to support your praiseworthy commitment to its prevention, to solidarity and to education in the legal issues involved."

Audiência Geral, 23/11/2005

"Both the regulation of the financial sector, so as to safeguard weaker parties and discourage scandalous speculation, and experimentation with new forms of finance, designed to support development projects, are positive experiences that should be further explored and encouraged, highlighting the responsibility of the investor. ... This is all the more necessary in these days when financial difficulties can become severe for many of the more vulnerable sectors of the population, who should be protected from the risk of usury and from despair. The weakest members of society should be helped to defend themselves against usury, just as poor peoples should be helped to derive real benefit from micro-credit, in order to discourage the exploitation that is possible in these two areas."

Caritas in Veritate, n.º65

A usura no Compêndio da Doutrina Social da Igreja

323 No Antigo Testamento percebe-se uma dupla postura em relação aos bens económicos e à riqueza. Por um lado, apreço em relação à disponibilidade dos bens materiais considerados necessários para a vida: por vezes a abundância – mas não a riqueza e o luxo – é vista como uma bênção de Deus. Na literatura sapiencial, a pobreza é descrita como uma consequência negativa do ócio e da falta de laboriosidade (cf. Pr 10, 4), mas também como facto natural (cf. Pr 22, 2). Por outro lado, os bens económicos e a riqueza não são condenados por si mesmos, mas pelo seu mau uso. A tradição profética estigmatiza as fraudes, a usura, a exploração, as injustiças manifestas, frequentes em relação aos mais pobres (cf. Is 58, 3-11; Jr 7, 4-7; Os 4, 1-2; Am 2, 6-7; Mq 2, 1-2). Tais tradições, mesmo considerando um mal a pobreza dos oprimidos, dos fracos, dos indigentes, vê neles também um símbolo da situação do homem diante de Deus: d’Ele provêm todos os bens como dom a ser administrado e a ser partilhado.


341 Se na actividade económica e financeira a busca de um lucro equitativo é aceitável, o recurso à usura é moralmente condenável: «Os traficantes, cujas práticas usurárias e mercantis provocam a fome e a morte dos seus irmãos em humanidade, cometem homicídio indirecto, que lhes é imputável». Tal condenação estende-se também às relações económicas internacionais, especialmente no que respeita à situação dos países menos desenvolvidos, aos quais não podem ser aplicados «sistemas financeiros abusivos, quando não usurários». O magistério mais recente tem reservado palavras fortes e claras para uma prática ainda hoje dramaticamente estendida: «não praticar a usura, chaga que ainda nos nossos dias é uma realidade vil, capaz de aniquilar a vida de muitas pessoas».

A usura no Compêndio do Catecismo da Igreja Católica

"O sétimo mandamento, antes de mais, proíbe o furto que é a usurpação do bem alheio contra a razoável vontade do seu proprietário. É o que também sucede no pagamento de salários injustos; na especulação sobre o valor dos bens para obter vantagens com prejuízo para os outros; na falsificação de cheques ou facturas. Proíbe, além disso, cometer fraudes fiscais ou comerciais, causar um dano às propriedades privadas ou públicas. Proíbe também a usura, a corrupção, o abuso privado dos bens sociais, os trabalhos culpavelmente mal feitos e o esbanjamento".

Compêndio do Catecismo da Igreja Católica, n.º508

A usura no Catecismo da Igreja Católica

2269 ... A aceitação pela sociedade humana de fomes mortíferas, sem se esforçar por lhe dar remédio, é uma escandalosa injustiça e um pecado grave. Os traficantes, cujas práticas usurárias e mercantis provocam a fome e a morte dos seus irmãos em humanidade, cometem indirectamente homicídio, que lhes é imputável.

2438 Diversas causas, de natureza religiosa, política, económica e financeira, conferem hoje «à questão social uma dimensão mundial». A solidariedade é necessária entre nações cujas políticas já são interdependentes. E é ainda mais indispensável quando se trata de travar «mecanismos perversos» que contrariam o desenvolvimento dos países menos avançados. Os sistemas financeiros abusivos, quando não usurários, as relações comerciais iníquas entre as nações, a corrida aos armamentos, têm de ser substituídos por um esforço comum para mobilizar os recursos em ordem a objectivos de desenvolvimento moral, cultural e económico, predefinindo as prioridades e as escalas de valores».

"Não se pode pretender que as dívidas contraídas sejam pagas com sacríficios insuportáveis"

"Com certeza que é justo o princípio de que as dívidas devem ser pagas; não é lícito, porém, pedir ou pretender um pagamento, quando esse levaria de facto a impor opções políticas tais que condenariam à fome e ao desespero populações inteiras. Não se pode pretender que as dívidas contraídas sejam pagas com sacríficios insuportáveis. Nestes casos, é necessário — como, de resto, está sucedendo em certa medida — encontrar modalidades para mitigar, reescalonar ou até cancelar a dívida, compatíveis com o direito fundamental dos povos à subsistência e ao progresso."

João Paulo II, Centesimus Annus, n.º35

Survival Shops Report Spike in Sales to People Preparing for 'Collapse' of Society... (CBS)

Poverty in the midst of plenty: Hunger persists in the United States

"Wherever there is a reckless borrower, there is also a reckless lender"

"The Irish government has suddenly complicated the picture by requesting debt relief...

"We are looking at ways to reduce the debt. We would like to see our European colleagues address this in a positive manner. Wherever there is a reckless borrower, there is also a reckless lender," he said, alluding to German, French, British and Dutch banks.

Mr Noonan hinted that Dublin is asking for some of interested relief on a €31bn EU promissory noted linked to the Anglo Irish fiasco, among other matters.

... Ireland has imposed haircuts on the junior debt tranches of rescued banks. Mr Noonan said this may now be extended to Bank of Ireland debt to help cover €350m of fresh capital it needs by next month. The state holds 15pc of the bank's equity.

... Ireland has no "detailed contingency plans" for a eurozone break-up. "Obviously, we have thought about it, but it's a very remote possibility," he said."

A Irlanda, tantas vezes apontada como exemplo - antes e depois da crise -, deveria agora servir como exemplo nesta questão da "restruturação da dívida" e, também, na preparação de um plano de contingência para a saída/fim do Euro.

Mas, infelizmente, o sobrinho do Dr. Jorge Coelho anda mais preocupado em esmifrar a função pública para poder pagar juros e dar dinheiro aos bancos, empresas de telecomunicações, "tecnológicas", sociedades de advogados, consultores, etc... (exemplos apresentados por aí abaixo).

Passos Coelho admitiu recurso ao "outsourcing" pelo Estado

"O ideal é que Estado conseguisse definir o que em termos tecnológicos cabe à própria administração fazer e o que pode deixar para o outsourcing", declarou Passos Coelho, na sessão de abertura do 21º Congresso das Comunicações da APDC.

O Governo criou um grupo de trabalho que procederá à avaliação da racionalização dos meios do Estado, para "perceber o que é preferível contratar e o que é preciso desenvolver internamente".

A tecnologia, acrescentou, tem de permitir o redesenho da Administração Pública... a introdução e utilização das tecnologias pode baixar os custos, nomeadamente, acrescentou o primeiro-ministro "de forma impresisonante na área da saúde, justiça e educação. Nestas, pelo menos, podemos baixar custos significativos".

Quem trabalha na Administração Pública (e não só) sabe que os processos de "outsourcing" e os projectos nas áreas das tecnologias de informação são:

Rápidos. Muito baratos. Tornam os processos mais ágeis. Não criam dependência em relação ao exterior. Não aumentam os custos de funcionamento em anos posteriores. Sobretudo, permitem grandes ganhos (pelo menos, a alguns dos intervenientes).

O sobrinho do Dr. Jorge Coelho está para as "tecnológicas", assim como o tio está para as empresas de construção civil.

German Bond Auction Falls Flat

"A surprisingly weak auction of German government bonds suggested that investors' worries about the euro zone are spreading to the core of the 17-nation bloc...

... The European Central Bank on Wednesday again bought Italian and Spanish bonds, both before and after the auction. Also hurting bond-market sentiment were reports that Belgium can't pay its agreed share of the planned rescue of the Belgian-French bank Dexia, which is seen as placing more risk at the door of the French treasury and adding another threat to that country's triple-A credit rating. Belgian and French officials denied they are renegotiating the dismantling of Dexia.

The weak German bund auction undid much of the support the ECB might have provided as investors worried that the crisis has now spread to Germany itself."

Italian unilateral euro zone exit scenarios

"In conclusion, a unilateral exit would be a devastating event for Italy and the euro zone. Inflation would be high but bank and national solvency issues would recede. If the exit were done under these nationalistic pre-conditions of redomination, most of the adjustment burden would fall on foreign creditors. Italy would become export competitive again and could focus on economic growth strategies instead of ones of fiscal adjustment. The benefit of this particular plan is that it can be implemented quite quickly.

Just as during the Great Depression, those countries that left the gold standard first saw the earliest return to economic growth. I would expect the same to be true here again for the euro area countries today."

Nada de novo em termos analíticos. A novidade é mesmo a referência à Itália.

Tenho um certo orgulho em ver as minhas analisezitas confirmadas pelos especialistas da área. Até agora, o único aspecto que eu não tinha considerado foi a necessidade de fechar as fronteiras.

Não conviria que Portugal fosse o primeiro a sair. Deixemos essa honra para a Grécia. Mas era muito bom que fosse o segundo ...

Nacionalização Vs Angolanização

Aqueles senhores que se auto-proclamam "os banqueiros portugueses" ficaram muito arreliados com a "nacionalização" imposta pelo Estado português.

Mas os mesmo senhores ficaram completamente eufóricos com os rumores sobre o eventual interesse do suntentáculo financeiro do estado angolano nas suas xafaricas.

Ou seja: a "nacionalização" imposta pelo Estado Português é má; a "nacionalização" que vem de Angola é boa.

O Estado Português é incompetente para gerir bancos; o Estado Angolano é especialista ...

The number of near poor startles the census

"... 100 million people — one in three Americans — [are] either in poverty or in the fretful zone just above it.

After a lost decade of flat wages and the worst downturn since the Great Depression, the findings can be thought of as putting numbers to the bleak national mood — quantifying the expressions of unease erupting in protests and political swings. They convey levels of economic stress sharply felt but until now hard to measure.

... The size of the near-poor population took even the bureau’s number crunchers by surprise."

Um conceito estatístico que será muito útil para descrever a situação portuguesa quando o "novo regime económico" que o sobrinho do Eng. Jorge Coelho pretende implementar começar a produzir resultados.

Livre dos constrangimentos impostos pelo "estado social" (a.k.a justiça), a Lei de Ferro dos salários transformará Portugal no Vietnam da Europa.

O futuro é vermelho: lojas de produtos portugueses em cada esquina da China ...

Spain 10-yr debt costs to hit new high as crisis deepens

Foram 6 golos claramente contra a corrente do jogo

Governo dá presente financeiro à TMN, Vodafone e Optimus

"As taxas de espectro vão baixar para metade do actual valor. O Governo opta por reduzir não apenas as frequências que vão ser leiloadas, mas também o que os operadores hoje pagam.

O Governo baixou as taxas que os operadores pagam pela utilização do espectro radioeléctrico. E baixou para as frequências que vão ser leiloadas em Novembro, mas também deu um presente à TMN, Vodafone e Optimus, ao reduzir os valores que os operadores já pagam."

Num "estado de emergência nacional" é preciso ajudar quem mais precisa. E como o sector é muito concorrencial, estas dezenas de milhões de euros não vão ser utilizadas para investir ou para baixar preços. O mais certo é acabarem nos bolsos dos accionistas (estrangeiros). O País fica mais pobre.

A chefe de gabinete do ministro da economia que, anteriormente, era directora da TMN, devia ter explicado isto ao Álvaro.

Iceland’s programme with the IMF 2008–11

"Some of the policies implemented in Iceland as part of the IMF programme have been called heterodox. The imposition of capital controls in particular has been so characterised as well as the ‘repudiation of debt’, that is, letting institutional creditors of the banks bear the costs of their collapse rather than Icelandic taxpayers.

The capital controls have worked in the sense that since they were rigorously enforced the exchange rate has been stable and inflation has come down.

... A few hours before the first bank collapsed on 7 October, the Icelandic Parliament passed what has become known as the ‘emergency legislation’. This law gave deposits and deposit insurance priority over other claims on the banks and gave the Icelandic FSA the authority to ring-fence the domestic part of distressed banks by transferring domestic assets and liabilities into new banks. When each bank fell, its deposits in Icelandic branches were transferred into a newly created bank. Deposits in foreign branches were given priority status as claims on the old bank. Bondholders of the banks – mostly foreign parties, but also Icelandic pension funds and the Central Bank of Iceland – were left with claims to assets remaining in the old banks, second in line after deposits and deposit insurance. This was the ‘repudiation of debt’...

There were, however, substantial costs. The net direct fiscal cost of the crisis amounts to approximately 20% of GDP ... the exchange rate depreciated by 40% over the first three quarters of 2008. By October inflation was approaching 20% and inflation and exchange rate–linked debt shot up. Balance sheets of most firms and many households were already in tatters. But it was still crucially important to stabilise the exchange rate in order to prevent even more damage...

In October 2008 the IMF estimated the gross fiscal cost of the crisis to be 80% of GDP – over half of that due to foreign deposit insurance. ... it was decided to postpone spending cuts for one year. This was a wise decision. In the winter of 2008–09, as private demand collapsed and unemployment shot up to levels not seen since the Great Depression, the support given to aggregate demand by public spending was very important.

The progressive fiscal tightening of 2-3% of GDP annually in the three following years has of course been painful, but it was unavoidable...

... Iceland re-entered capital markets less than three years after the biggest banking crisis any country has suffered..."

Germany is in the wrong currency

"Germany's merchandise trade surplus widened further in September as exports rose to a record high...

... the highest level since records began in 1990...

The data indicate that Germany's export-driven economy remains partly resistant to worsening political and economic developments in other euro-zone states. The economy expanded by a brisk 3.5% in 2010, helping drive unemployment to a 20-year low...."

Was the European crisis caused by the moral turpitude and spendthrift habits of lazy Europeans ?

"Germany has benefitted tremendously from the euro. Nearly all of its growth in the past decade can be explained by its rising trade surplus which, given monetary policy driven almost exclusively by the needs of slow-growing and consumption-repressed Germany, came at the expense of the rest of Europe...

And why do I say that Germany benefitted from the euro at the expense of peripheral Europe?

For one thing, take a look at ... the top ten trade deficit countries [between 1991 ana 2000 (i.e. before the euro)]...

Germany shows up every single year among the leading deficit countries – with an average rank of around four, which makes it worse than the average for Spain, Italy and Portugal. Toss in Austria, a country with policies that mirror that of Germany, and the “virtuous” countries of Europe turn out in the 1990s not to have been much more virtuous than the vicious ones. They turn up fourteen times instead of twelve and have bigger deficits on average...

Now take a look at what happened in the next decade [2001-2010 (i.e. grosso modo, euro era)] to the top ten leading deficit countries...

Pretty surprising, right? ... It turns out that Germany and the thrifty Europeans largely learned to love thrift only after the euro was established...

So how do we explain the European crisis? One theory is that the European crisis was caused by the moral turpitude and spendthrift habits of lazy Europeans along the periphery, in sharp contrast to the hard-working and thrifty countries of the center. According to this theory it is unfair to demand that Germans clean up the mess.

If you believe this theory, you are going to have to explain what happened in 2000 that turned thrifty Italians, French and Irish into spendthrifts, and that turned ordinary Greeks, Portuguese and Spaniards into even worse spendthrifts. You will also have to explain why spendthrift Germans in the 1990s suddenly morphed into the stolid, thrifty creatures of legend.

An alternative theory is that the imbalances were caused by internal policies – perhaps the creation of the euro and the gearing of monetary policy to German needs at the expense of the periphery? – which led to the severe internal imbalances. These imbalances created employment growth in the countries that suppressed consumption, and forced the countries that didn’t to choose between debt and unemployment. Of course since the latter countries had no control over monetary policy, the choice was largely made for them by the ECB with its excessively low interest rates, and their debt levels surged..."

As necessidades de financiamento do Estado e do sector privado tem de ser iguais aos saldos das balanças de transacções correntes, de rendimentos, de transferências unilaterais. Se a política do BCE provoca um déficit no lado direito da equação...

Italy is in the wrong currency

"Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy continue to order Italy to undertake further fiscal belt-tightening into the accelerating downturn, even though it is one of the few countries in the OECD club with a primary budget surplus and even though its combined public and private debt is just 250pc of GDP – well below that of Holland, France, the UK, the US, or Japan. The EU policy dictates have become unhinged.

Mr Berlusconi invited much ridicule in Cannes by blurting out that the “restaurants are still full”. Less reported was his comment that the country’s exchange rate is misaligned within EMU and that this has been “paralysing for Italy”.

This is the elemental point. Italy is in the wrong currency. It should not be in Germany’s monetary union at all".

Portugal em primeiro num ranking europeu

"Eurostat said Monday the biggest month-to-month declines in September retail sales were in Portugal, where they dropped 3.7%, and Spain, where they fell 1.7%. Sales in France, the region's second-largest economy, declined 0.6%. However, Germany staged a recovery, with retail volume in Europe's biggest economy rising 0.4% after a steep fall in August."

Soviet Brutalist Buildings

Aqui...

... e capitalist brutal buildings aqui.

Tough-talking Germany takes the eurozone to the brink of a break-up

"... Germany’s political and economic establishment would rather see the eurozone break up than risk its own national prosperity, and political stability, by allowing the ECB – and thus, Germany – to backstop the rest of Europe.

A currency with “no lender of the last resort” – that’s the incoherent reality of the single currency project, a reality that is now being mercilessly exposed.

... Re-denomination is now out there as an officially recognised possibility that could yet spark chaotic retail and wholesale bank runs. Firms and households in Greece, Italy, Spain – and eventually even France – could end up, to the extent they can, transferring domestic balances to German banks to avoid re-denomination risk. If this happens on a significant scale, what then? Capital controls? Within a single currency area? That sounds absurd, of course. But that is where the deeply flawed logic of Europe’s monetary union ultimately leads us."

The economic cost of Euro break-up (UBS Investment Research)

"...,[for Germany] the cost of bailing out Greece, Ireland and Portugal entirely in the wake of the default of those countries would be a little over EUR1,000 per person, in a single hit."

A brief history of monetary union break-ups (UBS investment research)

"Talk of internal depreciation is faulty"

"If the PIIGS could reduce prices and wages by 5% per year for five years, you would get the necessary cumulative compound fall of 30% in nominal prices/wages to restore competitiveness.

The problem with the deflation route to a real depreciation is twofold. First, deflation is associated with persistent recession and no social or political body could accept another five years of recession to reduce prices/wages by 30%; Argentina tried the deflation route to a real depreciation, but after three years of an ever-deepening recession gave up and decided to default and exit its currency board peg. Second, even if by some miracle deflation was feasible and successful, the real value of the already-high private and public debts would rise sharply (a balance-sheet effect), forcing even-larger defaults and debt reductions.

All the talk by the ECB and the EU of an “internal depreciation” is thus faulty: Even the often-heard argument that reducing public salaries would lead to a rapid real depreciation is erroneous as it would require private wages and prices to fall accordingly and would not prevent the damaging balance-sheet effects.

The alleged case of a successful internal devaluation—that of Latvia—is not relevant here: Entering the crisis, its public debt was 9% of GDP,...; losses from depression and deflation were taken by foreign banks dominating its banking system; and accepting a draconian 20% fall in output was politically feasible as Latvia did not want to fall into the harms of the Russian bear again.

And let us not forget that the necessary fiscal austerity has—in the short run—a negative effect on economic growth; thus, it postpones the recovery of growth that is necessary to make the reforms and austerity socially and politically feasible; and that is also necessary to make the debt and deficit ratios sustainable (as falling GDP increases those ratios, despite fiscal austerity efforts).

If the euro is not going to fall sharply, if reducing unit labor cost takes too long to restore competitiveness and growth and if deflation is unfeasible or (if achieved) self-defeating, there is only one other way for the PIIGS to restore competitiveness and growth: Leave the monetary union, go back to national currencies and thus achieve a massive nominal and real depreciation. After all, in all emerging market financial crises where growth was restored, a move to flexible exchange rates was necessary and unavoidable on top of official liquidity, austerity and reform and, in some cases, debt restructuring and reduction."

"Greeks will have 'Bulgarian salary with London prices"

"Ilia Iatrou, a housewife and mother-of-two in Athens, said she could not afford to buy fresh milk anymore."

The euro crisis has turned us into Wile E Coyote: we’ve run off a cliff, legs spinning. . . are we ready for the drop?

"No matter what we do at work - if we have a job - our futures look bleak...

... given the news pumped over the Channel, from whence ineffectual heads of government meeting follows unbelievable euro rescue plan on a near-hourly basis, it’s hard to shake the suspicion that all economic activity ... is pointless...

... my – our – future is dependent on the historical actions of banks over which, apparently, we had no control...

... I pass a homeless man, a beggar, most nights on the way home from work. Usually, I give him a pound, less often I pause for a chat. I’m not a fool who believes that those without material possessions hold an innate nobility, but nor do I imagine there’s anything intrinsically superior about me. He and I are separated by a slight degree in psychological robustness, and the possession, or lack, of enough income to pay a mortgage for three months. Otherwise, there’s the same basic mix of good intent and human weakness.

On Tuesday, I stopped and asked him how he was doing. It wasn’t one of his better days, and he turned his head away. Angry. I walked along Hackney Road, towards my contingent home, paid with my contingent salary, and I thought: one of us is still running, unaware of the lack of ground beneath his feet. The other has just stopped pretending. Who’s the more deluded?"

As vantagens de ter uma moeda desvalorizada em tempo de cris

• Germany Expects Tax Windfall (4/11/2011)
  
  "Germany's government said on Friday that it expects to take in more tax revenue this year than previously forecast, reducing the country's budget deficit and opening the door to tax cuts.
  
  The Finance Ministry said Friday it estimates this year's tax revenue to come in €16.2 billion ($22.4 billion) higher than forecast in May amid continued strength in the German economy. The Finance Ministry said Friday it expects this year's fiscal deficit to come in below €25 billion, rather than the previously planned €48.4 billion."
  
  
• German Bund Yield Drops to 4-Week Low as Greece Calls Referedum (2/11/2011)
  
  "Bund yields fell the most on record, with the securities outperforming all their euro-area peers, as investors sought the safest assets."
  
  
• German exports reach record leve in Augusdtl (10/10/2011)

Horas anuais de trabalho por trabalhador (2010)

Na última página do Jornal de Negócios de hoje vem um gráfico parecido ao que se apresenta de seguida - Horas anuais de trabalho por trabalhador (2010):

Os "preguiçosos" gregos e portugueses são os que mais horas trabalham entre os países da Europa Ocidental.

Simultaneamente, o PIB por trabalhador (2010) destes países é dos mais baixos entre os países considerados (fui buscar estes dados à mesma fonte utilizada pelo Jornal):

A questão estará em saber porque razão somos menos produtivos do que os outros: menor intensidade capitalística, métodos de trabalho e de gestão desadequados, produtos e serviços com baixo valor acrescentado, ...

Mas uma coisa parece certa, não será porque temos demasiadas férias ou feriados ou porque trabalhamos menos horas do que os outros.

Portanto, a questão é saber porque razão quer o Álvaro acabar com os feriados religiosos, por as pessoas a trabalhar ao fim-de-semana e aumentar a jornada diária.

Mercado de inverno

Seria possível contratar 2 ou 3 generais gregos - destes que agora ficaram desempregados -, para tomarem conta disto ?

Parece que custam menos que os generais alemães...

Saindo do Euro

"... Economists ...say the best parallel may be the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Monetary Union in 1919.

The main method of separation was over-stamping existing banknotes, but various parts of the empire also imposed forced loans to governments, capital controls and travel curbs to prevent people carrying suitcases of cash from perceived weak-currency jurisdictions to strong-currency ones.

This model, in theory, could be used in the euro area. With capital controls and curbing of the movement of people across borders, the "physical euro could be stamped and converted into national currency. Bank accounts could first be frozen and then converted at an arbitrary exchange rate," the UBS researchers wrote in a September research report.

They urge caution, however: "Any anticipation of stamping notes would lead to a run on banks in [perceived] weaker currencies—or people hoarding unstamped notes in the hope of converting them in another geographic territory."...

One key complication of exiting the euro is debt. Switching currencies would require changes in domestic laws to allow wages and incomes to be paid in the new currency. Domestic debt contracts—including mortgages and credit-card bills—would also have to be redenominated so as to prevent the instant bankruptcy of most households, which would see their debts unchanged but their incomes shrunk because they are denominated in new, less valuable drachmas.

Private borrowers—including banks—with debts outside Greece would not be able to re-denominate them in the new national currency and many would go bankrupt or default. Litigation would abound.

The government would also face an intensified debt crisis. Unable to borrow from financial markets, and probably from its erstwhile euro-zone partners, it would be forced to cut its budget deficit to zero. To do this, it would likely have to suspend interest payments to creditors.

... The economy would shrink at a stroke as the new national currency depreciated against the euro, but most of its government bonds would still be euro-denominated.

In the case of Greece, most government bonds are issued under Greek law, and the bonds could be redenominated in new drachma...

If that weren't enough, many economists argue also that the economic benefits of a sharp currency depreciation could be limited. Labor and other costs would fall but an improvement in Greek competitiveness "would be short-lived in the absence of further structural reform of labor markets, product markets and the public sector," Mr. Buiter says..."

Alguns elementos novos, face ao que anteriormente aqui tinha sido dito.

Esperemos que esta eventualidade esteja a ser estudada a fundo pelo Governo - existem vários aspectos que necessitam de salguardas.

Banks Conduct Greek 'Fire Drills'

"Banks across Europe are starting to take seriously what until now seemed only remotely possible: the withdrawal of Greece from the euro currency...

Banks are facing a host of questions about how it would affect the value of their Greek retail and commercial loans and sovereign debt, as well as their exposure to other countries where similar debt concerns could spread, such as Spain and Italy...

If the country decides to revert back to the drachma, the situation with Greece's creditors would likely land in the hands of the Greek Parliament, lawyers say. It would have to craft laws spelling out exactly what happens to the euro-denominated obligations of Greek institutions and individuals.

The most-likely scenario, based on previous instances of currency changes, is that euro-denominated loans would be converted into drachmas at a predetermined exchange rate.

That could stick big foreign lenders with hefty losses, as a newly minted drachma would probably lose value rapidly against the euro and other currencies.

Foreign companies that operate in Greece are also concerned about a sudden return to the drachma. A European bank executive said corporate clients usually move their earnings out of Greece every two weeks. A few months ago, that time lag shrank to every week, and now they move money out of the country as often as every day, due to concerns that Greece could suddenly abandon the euro.

Outside of Greece, a handful of major European banks were holding billions of euros of loans to Greek individuals, businesses and other institutions at the end of last year, according to recent European "stress tests." Among the largest: France's Crédit Agricole SA, which controls Greek bank Emporiki. Crédit Agricole reported holding nearly €13 billion ($17.9 billion) of corporate loans, nearly €4 billion of residential mortgages, and about €1 billion small-business loans."

Os milhares de leitores deste blog tinham já tido a oportunidade de ler esta história, embora o personagem principal fosse outro. Falta escrever a 2.ª parte do post sobre os meios que cidadão comum poderá utilizar para sobreviver à tempestade. Uma das defesas foi já enunciada no artigo de hoje: "move the money out of the country". Não é para todos (em primeiro lugar é preciso ter dinheiro no banco !). E de, qualquer forma, onde é que nesta altura os nossos depósitositos podem ficar a salvo?

Referendar o aborto está bem ! Agora referendar o Euro nem pensar ...

... há coisas sagradas que não se devem deixar nas mãos da populaça.

Quanto ao "memorando da troika", antes de Moisés ter subido à Montanha Santa e de lá ter trazido as tábuas da Lei, já Abrãao tinha subido a um banquinho e tomado nota numa placa de bronze do diktat dos triunviros.

BCE corta taxa de juro para 1,25%

Uma boa e inesperada notícia. Não tanto pela medida em si, mas pelo que sinaliza em relação ao "estado de espírito" do BCE.

Salvando a Grécia ...

"Regulators here and in Europe have no idea — repeat, no idea — of the full extent of the derivatives exposure that could be triggered by an “official” Greek default, or by the failure of a major French bank. And if the people in charge have no clue as to the fallout from what may be trillions of dollars in side bets waiting to be triggered in a catastrophic cascade, they’re basically flying blind." 

Washington Post, 28/10/2011

Todos os que querem regular os mercados de derivados são "all a bunch of socialists" que não levam em conta os enormes benefícios que estes mercados tem trazido à humanidade e os enormes perigos e consequências inesperadas que adviriam da regulação dos mesmos. E quem estiver interessado em comprar um terreno na lua, entre em contacto comigo que eu vendo a bom preço.

Porque é que o preço da gasolina está a aumentar?

Jornal de Negócios, 31/10/2011:

"A Galp Energia reportou nos primeiros nove meses deste ano uma descida de 4,5% na venda de produtos petrolíferos... Ainda assim a subida dos preços médios de venda permitiu aumentar a facturação global em 19%"

Conclusão: A gasolina é aquele produto cujo preço aumenta quando a procura aumenta e, ainda, quando a procura diminui !

E nos próximos tempos, com a esperada contracção da actividade económica, o que é que se pode esperar:

"... o contexto económico continuará a pressionar a procura de petróleo. Porêm haverá nos próximos meses factores de subida do preço, como 'alguns constrangimentos na produção do petróleo do mar do norte' e 'a lenta entrada em produção do petróleo proveniente da Líbia', diz a Galp."

Ou seja, quanto a Líbia deixou de produzir, o preço aumentou porque a oferta contraiu. Agora que o petróleo líbio volta a entrar no mercado, o preço aumentará ! Tudo isto em simultâneo com uma contracção da procura.

O petróleo é aquele produto que aumenta de preço quando a oferta contrai e quando a oferta, se expande. Especialmente quando, simultaneamente, a procura diminui.

É a concorrência no mercado livre a funcionar.

Metro Sul do Tejo: "Falta de procura custa 101 milhões" (ao Estado)

E ainda: "procura [prevista]de 80 mil passageiros por dia", mas "durante os dias de semana, em período escolar, entre 35 e 40 mil passageiros utilizam o MST"... destes "25% não validam o título"...

Euro-Zone Manufacturing Contracts contracted in October at its steepest rate since July 2009

"... adding to signs that growth is grinding to a halt and coming a day before the European Central Bank decides on whether or not to cut its key interest rate...

... The ECB will announce Thursday its latest decision on its key rate, currently 1.50%. But economists don't expect the rate-setting council to ease its monetary policy stance just yet. Inflation in October held firm at 3.0%, significantly above the central bank's target of just below 2.0%."

Portugal, Italy, Spain, and Germany. The implications of a suboptimal currency area.

Em Abril de 2006, Olivier Blanchard olhou para a sua bola de cristal e viu o futuro. 

É pena que o Sócrates tenha passado 7 anos a brincar aos "melhores primeiros ministros de sempre".

Ver também: Adjustment within the euro. The difficult case of Portugal (February 2006).

Assistir a um acidente em câmara lenta (I)

A Grécia não quer ser sacrificada para salvar os bancos franceses e alemães.

Logo, default.

Os mercados aumentam a pressão sobre a periferia, mas até a Bélgica, a França e a Alemanha são contagiadas devido à exposição dos seus bancos.

Os fundos europeus esgotam-se na defesa da Itália e da Espanha (o que aliás é um bom motivo para Portugal restruturar o mais depressa possível). Portugal necessita de nova injecção de fundos para fazer face aos buracões nos balanços dos bancos, mas já não resta dinheiro para Portugal.

Controlos de capitais, eventual "corralito".

Falta de liquidez e incapacidade de aceder aos mercados. Portugal entra em default.

Deixa de haver dinheiro para pagar salários, pensões, despesas de saúde.

O Governo é forçado a sair do Euro e a imprimir escudos. A moeda desvaloriza 30% ou 40%.
É necessário que, nesta fase, as dívidas externas, os débitos e os créditos sejam re-denominados em escudos; a alternativa é, de um dia para o outro, as pessoas ficarem com empréstimos com um valor real muito superior àquele que existia. Isto provoca novo buraco nos balanços nos bancos que é tapado por títulos da dívida emitidos em escudos.

Continua a austeridade, desemprego, falências, pobreza, inflação de 40% no primeiro ano. Melhora a situação orçamental (não se pagam juros da dívida).

Dava muito jeito nesta fase mantermo-nos na UE (se ela continuar a existir). Quando se implementam políticas beggar-thy-neighbour convém ter neighbours.

Exportações aumentam de forma muito significativa, importações diminuem, balança de rendimentos melhora (não se pagam juros). Emprego aumenta.

Retoma.

[To be continued]

BIG LIE

"... at least the Greeks are stripping away the self-serving claims of the creditor states that their “rescue” loan packages are to “save Greece”.

... This was done for one purpose only, to buy time for banks and other Club Med states to beef up their defences.

It was not an unreasonable strategy (though a BIG LIE), and might not have failed entirely if the global economy recovered briskly this year and if the ECB had behaved with an ounce of common sense. Instead the ECB choose to tighten.

... like the Spartans, Thebans, and Thespians at the Pass of Thermopylae, the Greeks were sacrificed to buy time for the alliance.

The referendum is a healthy reminder that Europe is a collection of sovereign democracies, tied by treaty law for certain arrangements. It is a union only in name."

Lições da história: o último a sair paga a conta

No Jornal de Negócios de ontem:

"Nos primeiros anos da grande depressão de 1929, assistimos a uma divisão entre os que defendiam a todo o custo a estabilidade do valor das moedas e os que optaram pelo abandono dessa estabilidade. Os primeiros mantiveram-se fieis ao padrão-ouro, enquanto que os segundos optaram por desvalorizar, a sua moeda... [O primeiro grupo] retom[ou] a recuperação económica em seguida às desvalorizações: permitiram a redução dos preços internacionais da produção desses países, as exportações aumentavam enquanto as importações diminuíam e o emprego aumentava em consequência.

... [No segundo grupo] Desemprego, crise bancária agravada e elevadas perdas de ouro ainda levaram a controles cambiais, mas em Março de 1935, a Bélgica e o Luxemburgo desvalorizam as suas moeda e saíram do bloco-ouro. Em Setembro de 1936, França, Holanda e Suíça aboliram o padrão-ouro e em Outubro, França e Itália desvalorizavam as suas moedas. O bloco da estabilidade monetária via o seu fim sem glória ou proveito, afundado em desemprego e com reservas internacionais debilitadas."

O governo exigiu e este blog cumpriu !

No mês de Outubro de 2011 este blog registou um pico de visitas, atingindo a sua melhor média de visitas por post.

Este extraordinário aumento de produtividade é resultado do aumento das horas de trabalho e do fim do descanso aos fins-de-semana e feriados.

Conseguimos mais (visitas) com menos (cabeça) - cumprimos as metas do Governo, da Troika e da física (a chamada meta física).

No mês que vem os posts vão passar a ser redigidos em chinês.